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counts. Finally, we extend our sincere thanks to Human Resource professionals at several private universities 
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In this two-part series, we provide a field scan of the dependent care flexible spending accounts (DCFSAs) 
landscape, focusing on child care expenses. We describe the proliferation and utilization of these programs, 
identify barriers to usage by low- to moderate-income (LMI) parents (those with household incomes at or 
below Area Median Income as defined by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, ~$50,000 
per year), and explain features of DCFSA design and program administration that address some of these 
challenges. We also identify opportunities for improvements in public policies and employer practices that 
can level the DCFSA playing field for LMI employees.
Part 1 defines dependent care flexible spending accounts and outlines the process through which employ-
ees may obtain reimbursement, the benefits that employers may experience by offering DCFSAs, patterns of 
adoption of such plans by employers and employees, and employee decision-making regarding plan partici-
pation.
In Part 2, we describe features of DCFSA design and program administration that address some of the chal-
lenges and provide a set of policy proposals for consideration by both employers and policymakers.
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II. Executive Summary
In 1983, the title of an article in the trade journal Pension World proclaimed, “A No-Cost Way to Provide De-
pendent Care Benefits,” (Alden, 1983). Dependent care flexible spending accounts (DCFSAs) had burst onto 
the employee benefits scene.
Never specified in or intended by any legislation, DCFSAs were forged from the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981 by a handful of employee benefits consulting firms that saw an opportunity to create a new line of 
business. By naming their new product “dependent care flexible spending accounts,” the consulting firms 
framed them as a way for employers to lay claim to providing dependent care benefits for their employees 
(Kelly, 2003).
Never mind that employers would not actually be spending money on dependent care – the accounts would 
enable employees to reimburse themselves with their own pre-tax dollars. Employers could offer a depen-
dent care benefit for the low cost of having the accounts administered by the consulting firms that had 
invented them (Kelly, 2003).
“A No-Cost Way to Provide Dependent Care Benefits,” Pension World declared. Indeed, the accounts proved 
to be quite a good deal for the consulting firms, who built successful lines of business administering the ac-
counts. They are also a good deal for employers, who gain tax advantages (reduced payroll taxes) and re-
coup a portion of salary expenses through employee forfeitures of unused account balances.
However, they are not such a good deal for employees, who reap far fewer benefits.
Higher-paid parents may have the cash flow to manage the “double-hit” of setting aside pre-tax dollars for 
reimbursement of child care expenses already paid for out-of-pocket. They may also have enough tax li-
ability to make reimbursing themselves for child care expenses with pre-tax dollars (up to $5,000, a fraction 
of total child care costs for many families) worth the effort, since high-income families disproportionately 
benefit from DCFSAs (National Women’s Law Center [NWLC], 2016). 
For example:
A Head of Household tax filer designates $2,000 of their annual income to contribute to a DCFSA.
If this employee has household income of between $13,850 and $52,850, they would pay a 
marginal tax rate of 12% on taxable income above $13,850 and up to $52,850.
This employee would save $240 on the $2,000 that they contributed to a DCFSA.
If this employee has household income of between $52,850 and $84,200 instead, they would 
pay a marginal rate of 22% for taxable income above $52,850 and up to $84,200.
This employee would save $440 on the $2,000 that they contributed to a DCFSA.
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As currently designed, DCFSAs do not represent a level playing field for low- to moderate-income (LMI) par-
ents struggling to pay for child and other dependent care. 
In Part 1 of this two-part series, we review the DCFSA landscape from the perspective of LMI parents, illumi-
nating the nearly unmanageable barriers to participation and highly complex decision-making process they 
must face to squeeze even the smallest benefit from these programs. 
In Part 2, we examine some infrequently-provided options in DCFSA design and program administration, as 
well as opportunities for improvements in public policies that can help level the DCFSA playing field for LMI 
parents.
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1. Introduction
Part 1 of this series explicates a range of design elements and administrative practices that create barriers to 
participation for LMI employees. 
In particular, LMI parents are likely to have difficulty managing the DCFSA double-hit, the process that re-
quires employees to both set pre-tax wages aside for child care expenses and then pay those expenses out-
of-pocket before submitting documentation for reimbursement. 
The first wave of the 2018 Household Financial Survey (HFS), distributed biannually to a random sample 
of LMI tax-filers using TurboTax Freedom Edition1, included a module of questions about DCFSAs that was 
issued to all employed respondents who had dependents. Findings from the HFS indicate that, indeed, the 
double-hit puts LMI employees with young children (under age 5) who used DCFSAs at risk; these partici-
pants were more likely to overdraft their bank accounts than those who did not use DCFSAs (χ2(1)= 4.76, 
p<0.05).
Data from the HFS also indicate that LMI parents are unwilling to take the double-hit risk if they do not have 
a financial cushion to help them manage the reimbursement delay. Survey respondents were asked whether 
or not they could find $2,000 in case of an emergency. Among respondents with young children (under age 
5) who had access to DCFSAs, those who were liquidity-constrained (“probably” or “certainly” could not find 
$2,000 in case of an emergency) were less likely to use a DCFSA than those who “probably” or “certainly” 
could find $2,000 in case of an emergency (χ2(3)= 10.09, p<0.05). 
Further, because LMI employees are less likely than their higher-paid counterparts to gain significant tax ad-
vantages through participation (National Women’s Law Center [NWLC], 2016), they may judge the low level 
of reduced income tax available to them through DCFSAs to be too small to make participation worthwhile.
Finally, DCFSAs include a use-it-or-lose-it provision in which contributions that are not used for reimburse-
ment by the end of a grace period following plan-year end are forfeited. Because LMI employees tend to 
have unstable child care arrangements (Henly et al., 2015), it may be more difficult for these workers to ac-
curately estimate their annual child care costs. As a result, these employees may be less likely to believe the 
risk of forfeiture is worth the potential tax savings. This phenomenon is known as loss aversion (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979).
In this final part of a two-part series, we provide evidence of employer practices that address some limita-
tions in DCFSA design and administration and offer policy proposals intended to:
•	 Provide meaningful incentives, such as refundable tax credits, for employers to offer substantive 
child care assistance to their employees;
•	 Address loss aversion that may prevent LMI employees from participating in DCFSAs;
•	 Reduce friction associated with DCFSA participation; and,
•	 Address interactions with certain tax credits (the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit and the 
Earned Income Tax Credit) and Medicaid.
1  Via Refund-to-Savings, a collaborative initiative among Washington University in St. Louis, Intuit Corporation, and Duke Univer-
sity to test behavioral interventions to encourage LMI tax filers to save all or part of their refunds.
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2. Employer Practices that Address Limitations in DCFSA Design and 
     Administration
2.1 In the Spirit of the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981: 
        Child Care Subsidies Provided by Employers through DCFSAs
In economics, the concept of friction refers to impediments to completing a transaction, such as the time 
and energy required to research a consumer purchase or fees associated with selling stocks (Conant, 1908). 
In the case of DCFSAs, there are many points of friction that reduce the attractiveness of participation, in-
cluding the effort required to search out information about how DCFSAs work, the time and energy needed 
to calculate whether or not participation will be financially worthwhile, and the effort required to submit 
expenses for reimbursement.
The most severe point of friction for LMI parents considering DCFSA participation is the double-hit: having 
less money in one’s paycheck due to pre-tax deductions to fund the DCFSA and then paying out-of-pocket 
child care expenses. The double-hit poses a cash flow challenge for LMI workers as they wait for reimburse-
ment. During this reimbursement waiting period, LMI workers, who tend to have very little in short-term sav-
ings (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015), must closely manage their spending and monitor bank accounts to avoid 
negative financial impacts, such as bank overdrafts and increased credit card debt. 
Two uncommon, but beneficial, employer practices help ameliorate the double-hit: child care subsidies and 
direct payments to child care providers. 
Kelly (2003) explains that legislators involved in writing the child care-related provisions of ERTA included 
language that would exempt employer-provided child care benefits from being treated as taxable income to 
employees, giving them a status similar to health insurance benefits. She notes that legislators, “hoped the 
DCAP [Dependent Care Assistance Program] provision would encourage on-site child care centers and direct 
subsidies of workers’ child care costs,” and that they, “expected employers to spend some money on child 
care services.”
At that time, as noted in Part 1 of this series, employee benefits consulting firms found a way to translate the 
language of ERTA into a new and unintended product that they could sell to employers: the DCFSA. During 
the course of our field scan, it became clear that offering employees subsidies for child care expenses in the 
spirit of ERTA was uncommon among U.S. employers. 
However, we identified some employers that had leveraged the existing benefits infrastructure of their     
DCFSAs to provide the kind of financial assistance envisioned in ERTA: several private universities and one 
large financial institution.
In addition to information from publicly-available sources identified through Internet searches and reviews 
of academic literature, we interviewed four key informants at three universities to gain insight into motiva-
tions for offering this type of child care assistance and organizations’ decision-making regarding processing 
these grants through DCFSAs. The universities were identified via snowball sampling following identification 
of one university that offered these programs through an Internet search. Each interviewee was asked to 
provide an introduction to colleagues whose organizations offered similar programs.
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Table 1 below displays plan characteristics for five private universities and a large financial institution.
University 1 University 2 University 3 University 4 University 5
Large 
Financial 
Institution 
Maximum 
annual income 
to qualify for 
subsidy
< $150,000
< $130,000 for 
one child; limit 
increases based 
on number of 
children, up to 
a maximum of 
$160,000
< $175,000 ≤ $130,000 adjust-ed gross income ≤ $120,000
< $100,000 adjust-
ed gross income
Single or 
multiple plans 
(eligibility re-
quirements vary 
widely between 
organizations)
Single Multiple Multiple Multiple Single Single
If eligible, 
amount of award 
varies by income 
level
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Awards vary by 
ages of children Yes No Yes No No Yes
Awards vary by 
number of     
children 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Award limited by 
IRS DCFSA rules Yes
Only for union em-
ployees’ program Yes
No, 
maximum award 
less than IRS limit
No, 
maximum award 
less than IRS limits
Yes
Awards 
administered 
through DCFSA
Yes
Yes for union em-
ployees only; non-
union employees 
receive taxable 
reimbursements
Yes
Employees’ 
choice; if a taxable 
payment is se-
lected, employee 
may contribute 
the IRS maximum 
$5,000 to a DCFSA 
in addition to the 
award
Yes Yes
Eligibility deter-
mination done 
by employer or 
vendor
Previously done 
by vendor; now 
done by employer
Employer Employer Employer Unknown Unknown
Reimbursements 
processed by 
employer or 
vendor
Vendor Employer or union Vendor
Vendor if depos-
ited to DCFSA; 
otherwise, taxable 
check delivered 
to employee (no 
reimbursement 
process)
Vendor Vendor
Tax return infor-
mation required 
for eligibility 
determination
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Four of these six employers structured their subsidies to favor their most financially-vulnerable workers. The 
other two employers provided a flat-rate award to eligible employees.
During interviews, key informants at Universities 1, 2, and 3 all emphasized the importance of providing as-
sistance with child care expenses to as many employees as possible, but emphasized that lower-income em-
ployees were given priority during the award-making process. These universities also increased the amount 
of their awards based upon the number of children in the household. One respondent noted that they took 
into account the “higher burdens” facing families raising children with special needs.
Household income universally played a role in determining employees’ eligibility for subsidies. However, 
maximum household income limits to receive awards varied widely and income was defined inconsistently.
Among these employers, maximum household income limits ranged from a low of $100,000 for the large 
financial institution to a high of $175,000 for University 3. However, some employers used adjusted gross 
income (AGI) from tax returns to measure household income while others used gross income or benefit-eli-
gible income. In the case of University 2, the maximum household income limit was adjusted for the number 
of children in the household.
Maximum household income limits appeared idiosyncratic. University 3, which had the highest maximum 
household income limit, is located in a high-cost city. However, University 2 and University 5, which had 
lower maximum household income limits, are also located in high-cost cities. The large financial institution, 
which has locations nationwide, had the lowest income threshold for eligibility. 
During interviews, universities indicated that they reviewed their plans’ maximum household income limits 
from time to time and adjusted them when they seemed too low based on factors like cost of living in the 
community or the cost of child care.
By creating multiple plans, universities afforded themselves the opportunity to gear plan designs to their 
strategic goals and balance benefits between unionized and non-unionized employee populations.
2.1.1 Most Employers’ Awards Give Preference to LMI Workers
2.1.2 Household Income is a Key Factor for Eligibility
2.1.3 Employers Give Varying Reasons for Offering Single or Multiple Plans
Universities compete fiercely for top-ranked faculty and offering child care subsidies appears to have be-
come a norm among private universities. Thus, several of the universities offered multiple plans based upon 
employees’ job statuses (faculty versus staff).
In these cases, interview respondents indicated that faculty plans were not run through DCFSAs so that 
awards would not be subject to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) limits. One participant noted, “When you look 
at [recruiting] faculty members, $5,000 is not enough to court someone [to join the faculty].” 
At another university, a respondent explained that giving grants on a pre-tax basis to non-faculty members 
meant that the full award amount would be available to employees, in contrast to taxable awards for faculty. 
 Recruitment of Top-Ranked Faculty
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One university indicated that providing child care subsidies outside of a DCFSA plan reduced the administra-
tive burden on LMI families. Referring to the university’s non-union staff members, a respondent explained 
that paying awards through their DCFSA, “becomes more of a nightmare.” The respondent explained that 
the documentation requirements for reimbursement were onerous for employees. The interviewee fur-
ther noted that the administrative requirements for reimbursement, as opposed to the up-front lump-sum 
amount currently paid to non-union employees at the beginning of the plan year, might not provide these 
employees with the access to resources for child care that the university wants to facilitate. The interviewee 
noted that the university adjusts award amounts up to account for employees’ tax liabilities, meaning, they 
calculate the expected taxes on the award and add that amount to the payment to the employee. In this 
way, the grant covers the taxes the employee would otherwise have to pay out of the grant awarded.
Another respondent observed that an advantage of having a separate plan for non-unionized, lower-wage 
workers was that the university was able to make awards that exceeded IRS limits on DCFSA contributions, 
further explaining, “Those [pre-tax] savings are viewed as less desirable when you’ve got the day-to-day of 
living to work through….If you’re living paycheck-to-paycheck, often [pre-tax reimbursements] are seen as 
more trouble than they’re worth.”
Key informants noted that having partially-unionized workforces necessitated multiple plans. In these cases, 
unionized employees had access to child care subsidy awards through their collective bargaining agree-
ments and these awards were generally administered through DCFSAs. 
Via an Internet search, we located publicly available information about a program offered by a large U.S. 
financial institution that offers employees the opportunity to set up automatic payments from their DCFSAs 
to their child care providers for eligible expenses. Per IRS regulations, these payments must be made after 
At the same time, the interviewee acknowledged that grants awarded through DCFSAs involved, “so much 
regulation.”
 Minimizing the Administrative Burden for LMI Families
 Collective Bargaining Agreements
2.2 Dealing with the Double-Hit through Plan Administration Methods: 
        Direct Payment to Providers
Some employers have attempted to ameliorate a significant limitation of DCFSAs: the double-hit that refers 
to the need for employees to set aside DCFSA contributions, pay for care out-of-pocket, submit documenta-
tion of these child care expenses to the plan administrator, and then wait for reimbursement. LMI employees 
rarely have the monthly cash flow or liquid savings to manage this reimbursement process. 
These employers offer streamlined reimbursement processes that help address the double-hit by eliminat-
ing the out-of-pocket payment and reimbursement requirement. We identified two models of direct pay-
ment: scheduled direct payment to child care providers and use of a flexible spending account debit card 
that can also be used for health care flexible spending account contributions (HCFSAs).
2.2.1 Scheduled Direct Payments to Child Care Providers
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care has been provided. The website indicates that the program requires employees to submit appropriate 
documentation as proof of service.
This option eliminates the double-hit by enabling employees to contribute the cost of care to their DCFSAs 
but avoid the second outlay of funds that would be required to pay out-of-pocket for care. However, admin-
istrative burdens for employees remain beyond documentation requirements for payment.
The example below demonstrates the challenges of aligning DCFSA contribution timing with provider pay-
ments.
As a result, although direct payments to child care providers have the potential to be of value to employees 
who may not be able to manage cash flow issues caused by the double-hit, the approach does not eliminate 
the friction that may make DCFSA participation undesirable.
•	 Employee is paid biweekly, 26 paychecks per year
•	 Child care cost is $200/month, $2,400/year
•	 Employee contributes $2,400 to their DCFSA for the full cost of care
•	 $2,400/26 paychecks = $92/paycheck contributed to DCFSA
•	 $92 x 2 paychecks = $184 contributed to DCFSA most months; in months with 3 paychecks, $92 x 3 = 
$276
•	 If employee sets up direct payments to child care provider for $200 per month, the payment will be 
$16 short in some two-paycheck months; employee will need to pay provider out-of-pocket
•	 Once extra funds are deposited in the DCFSA during a three-paycheck month, the balance will cover 
the $200 per month direct payment in full
•	 When that excess runs out, an out-of-pocket payment would be needed again, depending upon 
when three-paycheck months fall
•	 Depending upon the timing of three-paycheck months, the employee could also be left with a 
DCFSA balance after plan-year end and would need to use up the balance before the end of the 
grace period
A similar payment option that ameliorates the double-hit is available from employers who allow their work-
ers access to DCFSA reimbursement debit cards. While linked debit cards are commonly available for use in 
paying for medical expenses from HCFSAs, it appears that employers do not generally authorize use of these 
cards for dependent care expenses.
As with direct payments, IRS regulations require that payments be made after care has been provided. How-
ever, payments by DCFSA debit card do not require employees to submit documentation as proof of service 
as long as the provider uses a merchant category code that indicates that they are a child care provider. In 
the absence of an appropriate merchant category code, DCFSA debit cards may not be used.
The key limitation of DCFSA debit cards is that employees can only take advantage of this option if their child 
2.2.2 FSA Debit Card Payments to Child Care Providers
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3. Policy Proposals
DCFSAs present LMI parents with often unmanageable barriers to participation. These employees face a 
highly complex decision-making process when considering whether the modest reduction of income tax is 
worth the time, effort, and stress involved. Further, LMI parents face real risks by participating in DCFSAs as 
evidenced by findings from the Household Financial Survey (HFS) and statistics on forfeiture rates (Mercer 
Human Resource Consulting, 2013).
In short, DCFSAs were simply not designed with LMI parents in mind.
To make DCFSAs usable and valuable to LMI employees, public policy changes and employer practices must 
address the sources of friction and loss aversion inherent in DCFSA design. Specifically, the following issues 
must be addressed to improve DCFSA value and take-up by LMI families:
care providers accept payment by debit card. While child care centers may accept debit cards, home-based 
family child care providers and informal care providers, such as family members or friends, are unlikely to 
accept this form of payment. 
Since LMI workers may be more likely to use informal care arrangements, which are generally less costly 
than center care, they may not be able to make use of DCFSA debit cards (Henly & Lyons, 2000; National Sur-
vey of Early Care and Education [NSECE] Project Team, 2015). However, LMI families who qualify for federal 
or state child care subsidies may be better able to afford center care. These families may be able to make use 
of DCFSA debit cards for the portion of the cost of care that is not covered by the federal or state subsidy.
•	 The lack of meaningful incentives for employers to make contributions to DCFSAs and erosion of the 
value of the contribution limit;
•	 The use-it-or-lose-it provision and optional restrictions on qualifying events;
•	 The double-hit and reimbursement processing methods;
•	 The complexity families face when determining whether or not they will benefit from participation; 
and,
•	 Interactions with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit 
(CDCTC), and Medicaid eligibility.
3.1 Incentivize Direct Child Care Grants and DCFSA Contributions for LMI Workers with     
        Refundable Tax Credits
The National Women’s Law Center (2018) observes that the subject of tax credits for employers that provide 
child care benefits has recently re-emerged and further notes that such policies at both the state and federal 
level have failed to produce their intended results. Employer take-up rates remain extremely low decades 
after their initial introduction. The U.S. Child Poverty Action Group (2017) notes that lawmakers have previ-
ously proposed employer tax credits for DCFSA matching contributions. It seems likely that such a proposal 
will face poor take-up rates as well.
 For Policymakers
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3.2  Raise the Annual DCFSA Contribution Limit and Link Future Increases to 
         the Consumer Price Index
3.3  Address Loss Aversion: Eliminate or Relax Use-It-Or-Lose-It and 
        Modify Qualifying Event Rules for Changes in Child Care Providers
The current contribution limit for DCFSAs, $5,000 per year, has not kept pace with the rising cost of child 
care, which generally exceeds this amount for typical families with young children (Bivens, Garcia, Gould, 
Weiss, & Wilson, 2016). The contribution limit was established in 1984 and has never been raised. Raising the 
DCFSA contribution limit would benefit all employees. Increasing the limit could also benefit workers whose 
employers provide child care subsidies through their DCFSAs and are currently constrained by the $5,000 
limit.
Additionally, the DCFSA contribution limit is not tied to inflation and, thus, the value of contributions is 
eroded year by year. Tying the limit to the Consumer Price Index could also benefit LMI workers.
The concept of loss aversion derives from prospect theory and is embodied in the famous behavioral eco-
nomics phrase, “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). A large body of research dem-
onstrates that people will act in ways that seem counter to their own best interests to avoid losing some-
thing of value. In the case of DCFSAs, it appears that loss aversion plays a role in employees’ decisions not to 
participate in these plans even when they could benefit financially by doing so. 
Said another way, forfeiture of DCFSA contributions looms larger than pre-tax savings. 
The following changes that address DCFSA forfeitures may make this benefit more valuable for LMI employ-
ees.
 For Policymakers
Businesses and their lobbyists have long been highly successful in using tax policy to improve financial 
results. So-called tax loopholes provide corporations with many opportunities to reduce their tax burdens 
(Gardner, McIntyre, & Phillips, 2017; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016). Howard (1999) points out 
that tax policy has long been a hidden repository of U.S. social welfare policies as well; providing employers 
with tax credits for child care benefits is one example.
Such policies have failed thus far. However, existing credits are non-refundable. Given the number of U.S. 
corporations that pay little or no federal taxes (Gardner et al., 2017), non-refundable tax credits may not be 
particularly appealing to a large number of employers.
Providing employers with refundable tax credits for direct child care subsidies and/or for DCFSA contribu-
tions that are focused specifically on LMI employees would create a more meaningful incentive for employ-
ers to provide such benefits.
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Employees who are concerned about forfeiting a portion of their salaries if they have miscalculated their 
child care expenses may choose to forgo participation in DCFSAs, even in cases where they could reap some 
savings on child care expenses. Thus, eliminating, or at least relaxing, use-it-or-lose-it may increase partici-
pation by all employees, perhaps those whose budgets are tightest in particular.
3.3.1 Eliminate or Relax the Use-It-Or-Lose-It Provision
There is precedent for relaxing the use-it-or-lose-it rule in flexible spending accounts (FSAs). Legislation pro-
posed in 2011 would have allowed employers to distribute employees’ unused HCFSA balances at plan-year 
end as taxable income (Mulvey, 2012). Further, IRS rules for HCFSAs changed in 2014 and employers may 
now allow their employees to carry a balance of $500 of unused HCFSA contributions into the new plan year 
(Dennis-Escoffier, 2014). 
No such provision currently exists for DCFSAs, however. Implementing regulation changes that eliminate or 
soften the use-it-or-lose-it provision would benefit all DCFSA participants, including LMI employees.
LMI workers may be less hesitant to use DCFSAs if they believe their employers will help them avoid forfei-
ture by alerting those who end the year with outstanding balances. Prior to the 75-day deadline for submit-
ting reimbursement claims for prior plan-year child care expenses, employers and their vendors could audit 
employees’ DCFSA accounts and send alerts to employees who have not yet submitted reimbursements for 
any remaining balances. Alerts could include information about the 75-day deadline and instructions for 
submitting reimbursement claims.
 For Policymakers: Eliminate use-it-or-lose-it or align provisions for all FSAs
 For Employers: Alert employees at risk of forfeiture at plan-year end
Short of eliminating or relaxing use-it-or-lose-it, changing rules related to qualifying events may reduce loss 
aversion.
DCFSA contribution elections are made prior to the beginning of the plan year and remain in effect unless 
employees experience qualifying events. Qualifying events currently include changes in marital status, the 
birth or adoption of a child, the death of a dependent, or a change in work status. IRS regulations also permit 
employers to allow employees to change their contribution elections if they change child care providers dur-
ing the plan year (USC 26 § 125(4)(f)). However, employers are not required to allow such changes.
As previously noted, unstable child care arrangements are not uncommon among LMI employees (Henly et 
al., 2015). Frequent changes in child care providers can impact employees’ annual child care expenditures in 
unpredictable ways. For example, a relative or neighbor may become available to provide home-based care 
at lower cost than center-based care. Thus, requiring employers to include changes in child care providers in 
the definition of qualifying events may remove a barrier to DCFSA participation among these workers. 
3.3.2 Eliminate or Relax Qualifying Event Restrictions
 For Policymakers: Require that the definition of qualifying events include 
    elective provider changes
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Since DCFSA plans are complex, employees who experience a qualifying event may be unaware of rules sur-
rounding circumstances under which contribution election changes may be made. By proactively reminding 
employees of these rules, employers can help ensure that workers who qualify to adjust their contribution 
amounts can make changes to avoid forfeiture at plan-year end. Further, employers should include elective 
changes of child care providers as a qualifying event for DCFSA contribution election changes in their plans.
 For Employers: Allow contribution modifications for changes in child care providers 
         and communicate with employees about qualifying events rules 
         throughout the year
3.4  Reduce Friction to Increase Participation: Ameliorate the Double-Hit
As noted in Part 1 of this series, IRS regulations for health care flexible spending accounts require employ-
ers to give their workers access to the full amount of their annual elected contributions immediately at 
the start of the plan year. In contrast, DCFSA funds are not subject to this so-called uniform coverage rule; 
contributions are not available to employees for reimbursement until they have been deducted from their 
paychecks. If employees’ submitted child care expenses exceed the balances in their DCFSAs at the time of 
submissions, they will not be reimbursed for excess expenses until further deductions have been taken from 
their paychecks.
Bringing DCFSA contribution availability provisions into line with the HCFSA uniform coverage rule would 
help ameliorate the double-hit.
The double-hit makes DCFSA participation among LMI employees, who are more likely than their higher-
paid counterparts to live paycheck-to-paycheck, a significant burden. Both policymakers and employers can 
take steps to ameliorate the double-hit.
 For Policymakers: Align availability of contribution provisions for all FSAs
Avoiding the double-hit can also be achieved if employers deposit one-month seed contributions into 
their employees’ DCFSAs at the beginning of each plan year. These deposits would match each employee’s 
monthly contribution amount and would allow employees to begin reimbursements before they have an en-
tire month of daycare expenses deducted from their paychecks. Policymakers could promote the provision 
of these contributions by creating a refundable tax credit for the employers that offer them.
 For Policymakers and Employers: Create refundable tax credits for (and offer) 
            “seed money” matching contributions
Policymakers can acknowledge the reality of LMI workers’ experiences with arranging child care by requiring 
employers to include elective changes of child care providers as qualifying events for DCFSA contribution 
election changes.
Under such a policy, employees could change their annual contribution elections to align with revised 
estimates of their child care expenses, reducing the risk of forfeiture if new child care arrangements are less 
expensive than those used in their original estimates.
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Matching contributions of this type would come with a much smaller price tag than subsidies discussed ear-
lier. For example, a one-month seed money matching contribution for a participant who elected to contrib-
ute the maximum of $5,000 per year to a DCFSA would amount to less than $417.
Employers could choose to provide seed money matching contributions to all DCFSA participants or could 
limit them to LMI employees for whom the double-hit poses the greatest burden. 
Implementing methods of making payments directly to child care providers, as opposed to requiring em-
ployees to pay out-of-pocket and submit expenses for reimbursement, would also help address the double-
hit, albeit to a lesser extent than aligning DCFSA and HCFSA contribution availability provisions or providing 
seed money matching contributions.
Models for direct payment include facilitating automatic payments from employees’ DCFSAs directly to pro-
viders and allowing employees to use FSA debit cards to pay providers who accept them.
 For Employers: Streamline the reimbursement process through direct payment 
          to providers
3.5  Address Interactions with Tax Credits, Medicaid, and Federal/State 
         Poverty Alleviation Programs
As explained in Part 1 of this series, in some circumstances DCFSA use can interact with the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) and Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) that LMI employees may be able to 
claim. As explained below, in some cases, the interaction is beneficial and increases the amount of the credit 
for which LMI employees are eligible. In other cases, using a DCFSA is detrimental, lowering the amount of 
the credit employees may receive.
Similarly, in some cases, DCFSA use may help LMI employees qualify for Medicaid coverage, which can sig-
nificantly benefit families. Further, regulations are currently unclear concerning whether DCFSA balances are 
counted as liquid assets in determining eligibility for poverty alleviation programs such as the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).
In all of these cases, determining how their personal circumstances will look at the end of the tax year is 
extremely complicated for LMI workers, which is a substantial source of friction that can limit DCFSA partici-
pation. Loss aversion also operates in these cases because the financial stakes of eligibility/ineligibility are 
high.
Addressing these issues may make DCFSA participation more appealing to LMI employees.
As noted in Part 1 of this series, the CDCTC allows tax filers to reduce the taxes they owe by receiving a credit 
for child care expenses from the previous year. Currently, families may receive a credit based upon a maxi-
mum of $6,000 in child care expenses for households with two or more children. The CDCTC is a non-refund-
able tax credit, meaning, if filers do not owe any taxes, then they will not receive tax refunds or increase their 
 For Policymakers: Make the CDCTC a refundable tax credit and allow LMI employees 
    to claim the full credit regardless of DCFSA contributions
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The key selling point for DCFSA contributions is that they are deducted from employees’ paychecks before 
taxes. The underlying premise is that lowering taxable income is beneficial for employees.
However, LMI workers may be eligible for the EITC, a refundable tax credit meant to reduce poverty and 
reward work. Variation in the incentive for LMI workers to earn more money, thus raising their adjusted gross 
incomes (AGIs), is built into the EITC. At some points along the EITC curve, workers have a substantial incen-
tive to increase their AGIs, making DCFSA participation, which lowers the amount of taxable income used to 
calculate AGI, undesirable. At other points, workers’ refundable credit amounts decline as AGI increases. In 
these circumstances, DCFSA participation benefits LMI workers by decreasing the amount of taxable income 
used to calculate AGI, increasing the amount of the EITC credit they would receive.
Policymakers can address this dilemma by allowing individual taxpayers to choose whether or not to apply 
DCFSA contributions to their AGI calculations. Precedent exists for a policy change of this sort. For example, 
military service members are permitted to include or exclude combat pay from their AGIs for purposes of 
EITC calculations. Similarly, people who received emergency cash relief aid following Hurricane Katrina were 
allowed to use their prior year’s income in their EITC calculations in 2005, according to their preference (Bur-
man & Wheaton, 2005; Falk, 2014; Gould & Horowitz, 2011).
Poverty alleviation programs, such as Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), and the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) include asset 
limit tests for eligibility. LMI families are required to report any assets in their possession, such as savings ac-
counts, when they apply to receive benefits.
Currently, policy is unclear as to whether balances in DCFSAs should be included for asset limit tests. Only a 
few states clearly specify that accounts of this type should not be included during the application process for 
certain programs.
Policymakers at both the federal and state levels can improve the situation by explicitly exempting DCFSA 
balances from asset tests. Since DCFSA balances accumulate and are reimbursed frequently, it is unlikely 
that including them in asset tests could tip the balance for LMI applicants such that they would be denied 
 For Policymakers: Following precedent, allow individuals the choice to include or
    exclude DCFSA contributions in EITC calculations
 For Policymakers: Explicitly exempt DCFSA balances from asset limit tests for federal
    and state poverty alleviation programs
tax refund size by claiming this credit.
Child care expenses that have been reimbursed through a DCFSA may not be used to claim the CDCTC. How-
ever, if tax filers spend more on child care than the amount reimbursed through DCFSAs, they may apply the 
remaining amount to the calculation for the CDCTC, up to a total of $6,000 in child care expenses.
The CDCTC disproportionately benefits higher-income employees (Bell & Matsui, 2015). Policymakers can 
provide more generous child care benefits to LMI workers by making the CDCTC a refundable tax credit and 
by allowing families below a specified income level to claim the full CDCTC, regardless of their participation 
in a DCFSA.
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benefits. Nevertheless, providing clarity on this point could assuage loss aversion reactions and improve 
DCFSA participation rates.
Currently, LMI employees face a daunting task when attempting to calculate whether or not DCFSA participa-
tion will benefit them in light of the potential interactions identified above (CDCTC, EITC, Medicaid). Policy-
makers could create simple calculation tools, such as online calculators or worksheets that could be made 
available to LMI workers and given to employers for distribution during open enrollment.
The State of New York has created an online calculator of this sort, specific to its state laws, which could 
serve as a model (New York State, n.d.).
Employers can help employees make good decisions about DCFSA participation by alerting them to all of 
these potential interactions. Employers that have existing relationships with community-based organiza-
tions that support LMI families could refer employees to these resources for assistance in understanding the 
implications of DCFSA participation.
In this two-part series, we have examined dependent care flexible spending accounts from the perspective 
of low- to moderate-income parents and found them woefully inadequate to the task of helping defray the 
high cost of child care. How did we get here? Quite simply, the needs of LMI parents were not part of the 
equation when DCFSAs were invented by benefits consulting firms.
While DCFSAs offer employers and higher-paid employees some benefits, as currently designed they of-
fer much less value to LMI parents (Bell & Matsui, 2015), yet another example of the “upside down” U.S. tax 
code that disproportionately benefits higher-income taxpayers (Levin, Greer, & Rademacher, 2014). With so 
few family-supportive programs and policies available to American workers, DCFSA design represents a sad 
missed opportunity to offer even minimal assistance to the working families who need it most. 
We have offered a set of policy proposals intended to level the DCFSA playing field for LMI employees, in-
cluding providing incentives for employer contributions, reducing friction, and addressing loss aversion and 
interactions with tax credits/Medicaid.
DCFSAs fall significantly short of helping LMI families afford child care expenses (Economic Policy Institute, 
n.d.; Laughlin, 2013). More substantive responses to address the unaffordability of child care for LMI families 
could include implementing refundable tax credits for employers that provide child care subsidies, making 
the CDCTC a refundable tax credit, and increasing state and federal spending on a range of programs such as 
Head Start, public school pre-K programs, and the Child and Dependent Care Block Grant program (Bivens, 
Garcia, Gould, Weiss, & Wilson, 2016). Further, policymakers could explore ways to combine the EITC with 
DCFSAs by allowing LMI employees to advance some of their credit into a DCFSA early in the tax year and 
making those dollars subject to direct payment to child care providers.
 For Policymakers: Create simple calculation tools for LMI employees and make them
    available to employers
 For Employers: Alert LMI employees to possible interactions during open enrollment 
4. Conclusion
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